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Abstract

Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, Iceland’s three largest banks accumulated
assets totaling several times the size of Iceland’s GDP and financed their growth through foreign
borrowing. As wholesale funding dried up in 2007, they replaced this borrowing by rapidly gathering
deposits through foreign branches and subsidiaries located in the European Union, primarily in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the summer and fall of 2008, international credit markets
froze and the Icelandic banks were unable to roll over their maturing liabilities. On October 6, Prime
Minister Geir Haarde announced a full guarantee of domestic deposits. He excluded foreign
depositors, who made up about two-thirds of the three banks’ deposits. The Icelandic Parliament
passed emergency legislation allowing the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) to take control of
the banks and place them in receivership. The government placed all three banks into resolution
within two weeks. The Ministry of Finance created new banks out of the old banks’ assets and
liabilities, including domestic deposits, and injected government funds to restore their capital,
dividing ownership between the Icelandic government and the old banks’ creditors. The Icelandic
government also received an extensive support package from the IMF and loans from foreign
governments. Domestic depositors never lost access to their funds. The UK and Dutch governments
paid the banks’ retail depositors located in their countries’ branches in December 2008 and sought
reimbursement from the Icelandic deposit insurance fund and state. The Icelandic state and foreign
parties disagreed over the former’s legal responsibilities to back up the empty deposit insurance fund
and to treat foreign and domestic depositors equally. The negotiations, known as the “Icesave
dispute,” continued for more than four years. On January 28, 2013, the European Free Trade
Association Court ruled that Iceland was not responsible for paying foreign depositors. The UK and
Dutch governments received first claims on proceeds from Landsbanki’s bankruptcy estate later that
year. The bankruptcy estate made its final payment on January 11, 2016. The Icelandic government
officially lifted the full guarantee on September 9, 2016. Scholarly evaluations are generally positive
because Iceland preserved its payments system and basic financial services at the height of its
banking crisis. Scholars also expressed caution about moral hazard and other unintended market
effects associated with an unlimited guarantee.
Keywords: Icelandic banking crisis, Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund, Tryggingarsjóður
innstæðueigenda og fjárfesta, Icesave dispute
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Overview
Beginning in 2004, Iceland’s largest banks—
Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki—rapidly
expanded their lending, which they financed
largely by issuing bonds in Europe and the
United States in foreign currency (SIC
2010a). As liquidity dried up in mid-2007
during the early stages of the Global
Financial Crisis, Icelandic banks found it
increasingly difficult to refinance those
bonds. Instead, they turned to depositors in
their foreign branches and subsidiaries,
mainly in the United Kingdom and
Netherlands. They also increased their credit
risk, doubling their lending to foreign
parties. Total assets for the three banks were
nearly nine times Icelandic GDP by year-end
2007 (SIC 2010c). The banks’ foreign deposit
accounts outstripped the central bank’s
foreign exchange reserves and limited its
ability to serve as lender of last resort.

Key Terms
Purpose: “To diffuse all doubt that deposits by
Icelanders and private pensions savings in all
Icelandic banks are secure” (Haarde 2008)
Launch Dates

Announcement:
October 6, 2008
Authorization:
October 6, 2008
Operation:
October 6, 2008

End Date

September 9, 2016

Eligible Institutions

Domestic commercial
and savings banks and
Icelandic branches

Eligible Account(s)

Domestic, kronadenominated deposits

Fees

None

By September 2008, the banks’ credibility
Unlimited
was slipping, and their assets were viewed as Size of Guarantee
vulnerable to declines in price (FME 2009). Coverage
ISK 1.6 trillion (EUR
They collectively held about 70% of the
10.6 billion); ~110% of
Icelandic deposit base, equal to nearly 80%
GDP
of GDP (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
No payouts, no fees
The banks had no direct exposure to Lehman Outcomes
Brothers’ bankruptcy, but the American
Deposits had priority
bank’s unexpected failure on September 15, Notable Features
claims in bankruptcy
2008, had indirect effects on Icelandic banks;
proceedings;
interbank credit markets froze, and trust
guarantees did not
between market participants had vanished
cover foreign depositors
(FME 2009). On September 25, Glitnir
revealed to authorities that it could not pay its liabilities due the next month and attempted
to secure an emergency loan from the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI). CBI declined because
Glitnir was bound to face the same payment obligations in January 2009 and all its credit
lines had closed, so the Financial Supervisory Authority (Fjármálaeftirliti, hereinafter FME)
nationalized Glitnir on September 29.
Following the takeover, rating agencies again lowered Iceland’s sovereign credit ratings and
international creditors further withdrew their credit lines to Iceland’s other major banks
(FME 2009; CBI 2021). During the following week, Landsbanki’s online “Icesave” customers
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in the UK and Netherlands withdrew GBP 500 million (USD 900 million4)—about 5%5 of the
bank’s total deposits (FME 2009; SIC 2010c). Kaupthing’s online “Edge” foreign accounts
totaled EUR 5.5 billion (USD 7.8 billion6) on September 30, 2008, about two-thirds in the UK,
but within a few days Kaupthing’s Edge customers withdrew nearly 30% of their deposits.
Each bank’s liquidity issues had worsened after Glitnir’s nationalization (FME 2009).
On October 6, 2008, Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced in a public address the
government’s intent to fully guarantee domestic deposits, which then amounted to EUR 8
billion (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). He said, “deposits by Icelanders and private
pensions savings in all Icelandic banks are secure and the exchequer will ensure that such
deposits are reimbursed to savers in full” (Haarde 2008). Haarde did not mention foreign
deposits, which then amounted to EUR 15 billion. UK and Dutch officials interpreted this
omission as illegal under the laws of the European Economic Area (EEA) (Haarde 2008; HMT
2008b; EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). At the time, Iceland’s deposit insurance
system guaranteed each depositor a minimum of EUR 20,887 (Act No. 98/1999, Article 10;
SIC 2010b). The Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund (Tryggingarsjóður
innstæðueigenda og fjárfesta, hereinafter TIF) responsible for executing the guarantee had
just EUR 130 million in funds in October 2008 (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). The full
guarantee was never codified by legislation, and Haarde’s source of legal authority is unclear
(MOFE 2016).
Later on October 6, the Icelandic Parliament passed Act No. 125/2008 on the Authority for
Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances. The Act
empowered the FME to take control of banks and place them into receivership (Act No.
125/2008; PMO 2008c). The legislation also established depositors as priority claimants—
above other creditors—during bankruptcy proceedings. In doing so, the legislation broke
with precedent7 in EU Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 30
May 1994 on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, which treated depositors and creditors equally
(Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016; Directive 94/19/EC).
On October 7, the FME placed Glitnir and Landsbanki into receivership, the former at the
request of its Board (FME 2009). The next day, UK authorities responded to Landsbanki’s
sudden nationalization by invoking an anti-terrorism statute that permitted Her Majesty’s
Treasury (HMT) to freeze Landsbanki’s UK assets until UK depositor outcomes were clearer
(HMT 2008a; HMT 2008b). HMT effectively cut off the Icelandic state’s access to
Landsbanki’s subsidiaries in the UK (FME 2009). HMT also placed the UK subsidiary of
Kaupthing into administration and sold its online business, Kaupthing Edge, to a subsidiary
of ING Group “to [protect UK] savers’ money and provide certainty for retail deposits,” as
well as to “ensure financial stability, and safeguard the interests of the taxpayer” (HMT
On September 29, 2008, GBP 1 = USD 1.80, per Yahoo Finance.
Author’s own estimate according to FME 2009 (11) and SIC 2011b (42).
6 On September 30, 2008, EUR 1 = USD 1.41, per Yahoo Finance.
7 An external reviewer of this case observed that, under European bankruptcy law, without any legislation
stating otherwise, depositors and creditors have equal footing. This is different from the approach of the US,
which has historically prioritized depositors in bankruptcy proceedings.
4
5
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2008c). The moves rendered the Icelandic parent company “inoperative,” so the FME
nationalized Kaupthing and placed it into receivership on October 9 (HMT 2008c; FME
2009).
After all three banks had failed, the Icelandic authorities’ main goals were (1) to maintain
basic payment systems and financial services, and (2) to prevent the successive bank failures
from collapsing the Icelandic economy (FME 2009). The emergency legislation allowed the
Ministry of Finance to transfer the old banks’ assets and liabilities, including fully guaranteed
domestic deposits, to new banks: the process began immediately (FME 2009; BET 2017). As
the fair valuation of assets8 was difficult, the government transferred deposits at face value;
the deposit transition was “seamless,” and services were maintained for domestic depositors
without any interruption (FME 2009; Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016, 83–84, 121).
Accordingly, the full guarantee went unused, collected no fees, posed no additional cost to
the government, and officially ended on September 9, 2016 (MOFE 2016).
The full guarantee did not apply to foreign deposits, which alone equated to about 125% of
Iceland’s GDP (PMO 2008b; Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). Under EU Directive 94/19/EC,
the TIF was responsible for insuring deposits held in foreign branches of banks
headquartered in Iceland; host countries were responsible for insuring foreign subsidiaries
(SIC 2010b). In his speech outlining the full guarantee, Prime Minister Haarde did not
mention Iceland’s coverage of foreign branches, which onlookers interpreted as the
intentional exclusion of foreign depositors (R&I 2008). Thereafter, European countries
addressed cross-border deposit issues with Kaupthing’s and Glitnir’s subsidiaries and
branches in various ways: providing them with emergency liquidity, placing them into public
administration and resolution, selling Icelandic assets privately, and funding depositor
claims with proceeds from the bankruptcy estates (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016, 144;
GRJ 2018).
Landsbanki’s depositor problems persisted because it had amassed liabilities through online
deposits in the UK and the Netherlands, which created a significant currency mismatch
(Tynes 2017). After UK authorities froze UK accounts associated with Landsbanki, the CBI,
and other Icelandic regulators, foreign banks refrained from disbursing funds to Icelandic
banks until UK claims were met, which made it difficult for the CBI to preserve basic payment
services (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). In the first two weeks of October 2008, the
domestic demand for cash spiked and almost drained the CBI’s supply of currency (CBI
2018). The CBI became responsible for operating Iceland’s settlement system for card
transactions, so when the rate of transactions increased 10-fold during the crisis, the CBI
risked running out of cash with which it could intermediate (CBI 2018; Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016, 84). The CBI later argued that the full guarantee, along with the
emergency legislation, stabilized the demand for cash and maintained the functionality of
domestic payment processes (CBI 2018).

According to one external reviewer, the new banks issued contingent bonds to account for the uncertain
valuation, allowing the bankruptcy claimants to participate in upside of specific bundles of assets.
8
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UK and Dutch authorities compensated their own Icesave depositors up front for the insured
amounts and pursued reimbursement from the Icelandic government—either from the TIF
or from the state coffers—in a five-year legal battle known as the Icesave dispute (Jónsson
and Sigurgeirsson 2016). The plaintiffs argued that the Icelandic state was obligated under
EEA law to both replenish its exhausted TIF and treat all depositors equally. On January 28,
2013, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court, which adjudicates legal issues
pertaining to free trade and equal competition within the European Economic Area, ruled
that the Icelandic government did not have to further support the TIF with public funds or
pay foreign depositors. The EFTA Court also ruled that UK and Dutch governments were
entitled to proceeds from the Landsbanki bankruptcy estate to cover any shortfalls in
depositor payments (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016, 151; EFTA Court n.d.; EFTA
Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). The Landsbanki estate made its final payment on
January 11, 2016 (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). After the estate achieved full settlement,
foreign institutional investors and several Icelandic entities, including pension funds, bore
ultimate losses around EUR 10 billion.
Summary Evaluation
The Icelandic authorities have argued that their response to the crisis was successful. The
government ultimately made no payouts on the unlimited guarantee, having nationalized,
resolved, and restructured the banks (MOFE 2016). Equipped with an IMF package of USD
2.1 billion and nearly USD 3 billion in further loans from foreign governments, the Icelandic
government reformed its banking system and helped the economy to recover fully in the
decade after the crisis (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016; Thomsen 2018). When the Icelandic
authorities decided to guarantee depositor accounts in Icelandic krona (ISK), foreign
governments opted to bail out their retail depositors by an estimated EUR 3.65 billion in
total—about 40% of Iceland’s GDP in late 2008 (GRJ 2018). The UK authorities criticized
Iceland for not supporting depositors with accounts in Landsbanki’s (foreign) Icesave
branch, a move which HMT deemed “discriminatory and unlawful treatment” (HMT 2008b).
Seeking recourse, the UK and the Netherlands isolated Iceland from the international
payment system, withheld votes to release the IMF funds until Iceland agreed to guarantee
Icesave’s liabilities, and pursued retroactive depositor payments from the TIF and the
Icelandic state through EFTA Court (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). Meanwhile, the bailin of creditors (mostly foreign) was an essential and controversial part of the program.
Creditors, whose claims legally ranked on par with those of depositors before the crisis,
ended up losing about EUR 10 billion when the Icelandic authorities changed the rules. While
the international courts ultimately ruled that Iceland had not breached EEA law, the opposite
ruling would have saddled the Icelandic state with high levels of debt (GRJ 2018).
In the wake of the banking collapse and associated measures, domestic depositors retained
access to their funds and executed transactions without interruption (Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016). Bank deposits increased by 19% in the first two months after the banks
failed, which the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) attributes to four mechanisms (CBI 2009a).
First, Icelandic investors received about ISK 100 billion (USD 780 million9) from the
9

On October 5, 2008, ISK 1 = USD 0.0078, per Yahoo Finance.
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liquidation of investment and money market instruments, so the deposit influx represented
“a shift between asset categories rather than a net increase in deposits” (CBI 2009a). Second,
there was a flight to safety from corporate bonds to deposits—an event that CBI directly
attributes to the passage of emergency legislation in October 2008 and the full deposit
guarantee (CBI 2009a; CBI 2009c). Third, capital controls prevented domestic savers from
making foreign investments, Iceland’s equity markets had collapsed, and corporations had
delisted; the general limitation of investment options steered capital toward bank deposits
(CBI 2009a). Fourth, pension funds might have invested in deposits over other assets due to
temporary uncertainty about the payouts of supplementary pension savings. Banks also
benefitted from the full guarantee, which, along with the capital controls, protected their
capitalization (CBI 2010). However, banks still struggled to convert deposits into loans due
to ongoing uncertainty about the health of their balance sheets (CBI 2009a).
The guarantee is regarded as successful, insofar as it halted further runs on Icelandic banks
(OECD 2013). One CBI report argues that the full guarantee was one of several measures
that, in sum, contributed to the reduction of uncertainty and stabilization of demand for cash
(CBI 2018). The government’s support measures, including the guarantee, were crucial in
“ensuring the efficacy of payment intermediation” (CBI 2018).
Scholars agree that the Icelandic government’s decision to guarantee only domestic deposits
in ISK, though controversial, was the only option. According to one external reviewer, the
Icelandic authorities’ foreign exchange (FX) reserves were depleted, and domestic bank
liabilities were denominated almost entirely in FX. The Icelandic state could not have
credibly guaranteed FX deposits or liabilities; to do so would have risked accelerating the
sudden-stop capital flight that was already underway, and this argument later held up in
EFTA Court. In contrast to the Irish government, which guaranteed all bank liabilities,
Icelandic authorities could not have afforded the same (BDZ 2011). According to the same
external reviewer, most scholars also agree with Iceland’s decision to prioritize depositors
over other claimants in bankruptcy proceedings. Ásgeir Jónsson argues that Iceland
authorities’ decisions to elevate the depositors and restructure the banks enabled the
country’s return to sovereign debt markets in 2011, and he praises Icelandic restructuring
over the Irish “bailout” strategy (Jónsson 2011).
The guarantee also evoked concerns from the CBI about potential undesirable financial
effects, which included (1) price distortion in equity and bond markets, (2) unpredictable
interbank depositor flows related to disparate deposit rates, (3) higher contingent liabilities
for the state, (4) relaxed attitudes toward liquidity risk, (5) moral hazard, and (6) increased
systemic risk (CBI 2009b). In response, the CBI urged the Icelandic government to restrict
the size of the guarantee, impose a ceiling on interest rates for government-guaranteed
deposits, or limit deposit insurance to retail—rather than interbank—deposits.
In December 2008, the Icelandic Parliament formed the Special Investigation Commission
(SIC) to investigate and analyze the collapse of Iceland’s three largest banks. The SIC partially
attributed the Icesave dispute to domestic inaction, arguing that financial regulators had
failed to create an adequate contingency plan in the several years leading up to the bank
failures in October 2008 (SIC 2010a). The banks underwent rapid deposit growth beginning
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in 2006, which elevated the TIF’s contingent liabilities and challenged its ability to guarantee
deposits in the event of a large financial insolvency. Had the TIF exercised foresight, the SIC
argued, it would have formally requested Landsbanki to transfer Icesave accounts to a
foreign subsidiary—with clear implications for the TIF’s “relations to foreign regulatory
bodies and central banks” (SIC 2010a). Instead, the TIF’s potential liabilities remained an
open question, and the TIF did not clarify its potential payment obligations within EEA/EU
legal contexts before the banks collapsed—even after foreign governments inquired
throughout the summer of 2008 about the TIF’s coverage of foreign banks and subsidiaries
headquartered in Iceland. The SIC argued that a contingency plan, which never materialized,
was “sorely needed” in the run-up to the crisis (SIC 2010a).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) became involved in mid-October 2008, and on
November 19, its Executive Board approved a $2.1 billion Stand-By Arrangement, which
facilitated the Icelandic economy’s strong recovery in the decade after its banking collapse
(Thomsen 2008; Thomsen 2018). Poul Thomsen, who led the IMF’s Iceland deal, later
attributed the success of the package to four features. First, the package did not have upfront conditionalities on structural reform, so Iceland avoided domestic political resistance
and kept the program “nimble and fast” (Thomsen 2018). Second, the package allowed
automatic fiscal stabilizers to kick in and public debt to rise by deferring fiscal consolidation
to the program’s second year. Consequently, Iceland avoided critical delays in financing and
refrained from raising taxes or reducing spending during the crisis, which could have further
dampened private demand. Third, capital controls were conducive to flexible monetary and
exchange rate policy when the risks of large FX drains were “overwhelming”; without the
controls, Poul argues, the krona would have depreciated, and CBI would have raised rates
higher, further constraining Iceland’s economic growth and balance sheets (Thomsen 2018).
The capital controls also prevented liquidity from flowing out of the new banks and kept
domestic depositors from exiting the Icelandic financial system (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson
2016). Finally, Iceland’s insistence on a bail-in structure, including the ringfencing of
domestic depositors, limited the public cost and contributed to the state’s high fiscal gains
coming out of the crisis—estimated at 43% of GDP in 2016 (Thomsen 2018).
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Context: Iceland 2007–2009
GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

USD 22 billion in Q4, 2007
USD 19 billion in Q4, 2008
USD 13 billion in Q4, 2009
USD 69,496 in Q4, 2007
USD 56,943 in Q4, 2008
USD 41,301 in Q4, 2009
As of year-end 2007:
Moody’s: N/A
S&P: A+
Fitch: N/A
As of year-end 2008:
Moody’s: Baa1
S&P: BBBFitch: BBB-

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

As of year-end 2009:
Moody’s: Baa3
S&P: BBBFitch: BBBUSD 54 billion in 2007
USD 37 billion in 2008
USD 25 billion in 2009
251% in 2007
198% in 2008
191% in 2009

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system

Data not available
Data not available

Foreign involvement in banking system

Data not available

Government ownership of banking system

Data not available
Up to EUR 20,887 in 2007–2008;
unlimited for domestic depositors
between October 6, 2008, and
September 9, 2016

Existence of deposit insurance

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset; Act No. 98/1999; Haarde 2008; MOFE 2016.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The full guarantee was meant to secure the domestic payment system.
After all three banks had failed, Icelandic authorities’ main goals were to “ensure the
functionality of domestic payment systems and . . . basic financial services” and to “prevent .
. . a domino effect that would result in a general collapse of the Icelandic economy” (FME
2009). Within the larger objectives, the government implemented an emergency guarantee
to allow consumers to quickly access their deposits (TIF 2011). The government transferred
deposits at face value from the old banks to newly established banks; the deposit transition
was “seamless,” and services were maintained for domestic depositors without any
interruption (FME 2009; Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016, 83–84, 121). The full guarantee
went unused, collected no fees, posed no additional cost to the government, and officially
ended on September 9, 2016 (MOFE 2016).
2. Part of a Package: The full guarantee was accompanied by capital injections,
resolution and restructuring measures, and capital controls.
Icelandic authorities responded to the banking crisis by directly intervening in the banking
system (FME 2009). By the first week of October, Iceland’s three largest banks were suffering
large withdrawals of deposits and credit lines. The Icelandic Parliament passed an
emergency legislation package on October 6, 2008, allowing the FME to take control of the
banks (Haarde 2008). When Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced this package to the
public, he reassured domestic savers and private pensioners that their deposits would be
guaranteed “in full,” without specifying a limit. The FME seized all three banks, placed them
into receivership between October 7 and 9, 2008, divided each into an old and a new bank,
and restructured the new banks’ balance sheets (FME 2009).
Non-deposit interventions included a USD 2.1 billion IMF loan, extensions of central bank
swap facilities, and restrictions on short-selling and foreign exchange transactions (CBI
2008a; CBI 2008b; FME 2008b; CBI 2008c).
The IMF began an emergency mission in Iceland in mid-October 2008, and the Executive
Board approved a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) on November 19 worth USD 2.1 billion
(Thomsen 2008; Thomsen 2018). The SBA succeeded due to Iceland’s strong “ownership”
and willingness to follow through with program requirements (Thomsen 2018). The SBA’s
narrow conditionalities—restoring monetary stability, rebuilding the banking system, and
consolidating the large fiscal deficit—facilitated fast action and concrete domestic support
for reform.
The SBA also mandated capital controls on an indefinite timeline to address Iceland’s
deteriorating exchange rate (Thomsen 2018). At the time, capital controls were a novel and
controversial demand because IMF programs usually insisted on liberalizing capital controls
early in the recovery timeline, and the use of capital controls in western Europe could have
spurred other vulnerable countries in eastern Europe to do the same. However, Iceland’s
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stakeholders viewed the Icelandic case as an outlier and believed that it was unlikely to
inspire similar measures elsewhere. The capital controls allowed Icelandic authorities to
liberalize current account controls and later to safely lower interest rates. The capital
controls also prevented liquidity from flowing out of the reestablished banks and stopped
domestic depositors from exiting the Icelandic financial system (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson
2016). After Iceland completed its SBA, global actors began to accept capital controls as part
of the IMF’s crisis tool kit (Thomsen 2018).
In addition to the IMF’s SBA, Iceland received USD 3 billion in loans from foreign
governments, further enabling the Icelandic government to reform its banking system and
helping the economy to recover in the decade after the crisis (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson
2016; Thomsen 2018).
3. Legal Authority: Original legislation established deposit insurance in 1999;
emergency legislation passed in 2008 gave priority claims to depositors during
bankruptcy, which was challenged and upheld in EFTA court.
In his speech on October 6, 2008, Prime Minister Haarde did not specify a source of legal
authority by which the government fully guaranteed domestic deposits (Haarde 2008).
Iceland’s original legal authority for deposit insurance stemmed from the Act No. 98/1999
on Deposit Guarantees and Investor-Compensation Scheme (Act No. 98/1999), which
Iceland adopted to comply with the EU Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes;
Iceland became a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement on January 1,
1994 (SIC 2010b). Iceland’s Act No. 98/1999 established a deposit guarantee scheme (DGS)
related to commercial and savings bank deposits and an investment guarantee scheme
related to trading—both were meant to bolster investor protections against insolvency of
financial institutions. The minimum value of the deposit guarantee was the ISK equivalent of
EUR 20,887 per depositor (Act No. 98/1999, Article 10; SIC 2010b). The legislation assigned
Iceland’s DGS responsibilities to the Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund (TIF), which
is a private organization that requires membership by commercial banks, savings banks, and
securities trading firms (SIC 2010b). Act No. 98/1999 also specified the two events that
could trigger a depositor payout process: (1) the FME issues an opinion stating that the
financial institution is unable to pay its depositor claims, or (2) the financial institution
enters into bankruptcy (Act No. 98/1999, Article 9).
On October 6, 2008, the Icelandic Parliament passed Act No. 125/2008 “on the Authority for
Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc.” (Act No.
125/2008, 6). Policymakers created Act No. 125/2008 to allow Icelandic authorities to
respond promptly to financial conditions, with the aim of maintaining the functioning of
Iceland’s financial markets and banking system (PMO 2008c). With regards to deposit
insurance, Chapter IV of the new legislation amended Act No. 98/1999 in the following ways:
•

deposits were given priority claims during insolvency proceedings;

•

all deposit reimbursements could be transacted in Icelandic krona;
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•

the TIF paid fixed-rate deposit balances by following the account’s terms, so the TIF
did not have to pay account owners before the owners could have withdrawn the
account balance; and

•

the TIF was authorized to net a depositor’s liabilities against payouts—in other
words, to reduce a customer’s deposit payout by the amount of his or her
outstanding debt to the financial institution. (PMO 2008c)

Act No. 125/2008 established a bail-in framework: depositors became priority claimants
and general creditors—mostly foreign institutional investors—took losses, which lowered
the potential costs of the deposit guarantee (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). Besides its
depository amendments, Act No. 125/2008 allowed the Minister of Finance to create new
financial institutions or nationalize10 existing ones, and the legislation granted the Financial
Supervisory Authority (FME) the authority to intervene in financial institutions’ regular
operations to minimize the risk of damage to financial markets (Act No. 125/2008, chap. I–
III; PMO 2008c). When the FME used its emergency powers to take control of Iceland’s three
largest banks, it published press releases highlighting the full guarantee of domestic deposits
and specified that the banks’ operations ought to continue without interruption (FME 2008a;
FME 2008c; FME 2008d).
Though the TIF did not make payouts during the Icelandic financial crisis, its payout statutes
were a source of contention during the Icesave dispute (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016;
MOFE 2016). Iceland’s full guarantee faced two legal challenges. First, EU Directive
94/19/EC required that the deposit insurer in a parent company’s home company (e.g.,
Iceland) must cover deposits held in the bank’s foreign branches—unless the host country
(e.g., the UK or Netherlands) offered higher coverage out of its own guarantee fund, which
obliged the host country to extend membership to the same foreign branches (SIC 2010b).
However, the host country’s deposit insurer was responsible for covering any subsidiaries
incorporated in the host country. In other words, the UK and Dutch deposit insurers would
have to cover Icelandic banks’ subsidiaries that took deposits within their borders, but not
Icelandic banks’ branches. But the UK and Dutch authorities compensated their own Icesave
(branch) depositors early in the crisis. They then sought reimbursement from the TIF and
later the Icelandic state, arguing based on the EU Directive that it was TIF’s responsibility to
cover Icelandic banks’ foreign branches. If the TIF was exhausted, they argued, then the
Icelandic government needed to replenish its funding (SIC 2010b). Furthermore, paying
domestic depositors and not foreign depositors, the plaintiffs argued, was discriminatory on
the basis of nationality and, therefore, in violation of the EU Directive (EFTA Surveillance
Authority v. Iceland 2013). They also argued that Iceland’s bail-in framework broke a
precedent of pari passu—equal ranking—between bondholders and depositors by
establishing depositors as priority claimants during bankruptcy proceedings (Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016; Directive 94/19/EC).

According to one external reviewer, not all banks were nationalized to the same extent. Generally, the
government reduced its ownership in the banks after reestablishing them.
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Icelandic officials successfully defended their actions in EFTA Court by arguing that domestic
depositors were reimbursed in inconvertible ISK, whereas foreign depositors received hard
currency, so there was no grounds for discrimination (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
With respect to the precedent of pari passu treatment, Iceland cited force majeure and
claimed that it had no alternative, given the need to preserve the domestic payment system
by prioritizing deposits and shifting them to new banks.
4. Administration: Deposit insurance was administered by the TIF. It is unclear
which entity would have been responsible for exercising the full guarantee.
The TIF is a private organization with Deposits and Securities Departments, each with
separate accounting and financing; the TIF is not state-owned, so the Icelandic government
has no legal responsibility for the debts incurred by the TIF (Ásgeirsson 2005; SIC 2010b).
The TIF ensures depositors of a minimum guarantee up to EUR 20,887 per account and
assumes the original institution’s risk of non-repayment to the depositor (TIF 2011; Act No.
98/1999, Article 10; SIC 2010b). TIF membership was compulsory under Act No. 98/1999
for commercial banks, savings banks investment firms, and securities trading companies
established in Iceland—including any branches located outside of Iceland in the EEA and
EFTA (Ásgeirsson 2005). The TIF made decisions through a six-member Board of Directors,
each of whom served two-year terms (Act No. 98/1999, Article 4). According to an
agreement between the TIF and the CBI, a CBI representative typically served as the TIF’s
managing director; in October 2008, the TIF managing directors included an officer from the
CBI’s Financial Stability Department and an Icelandic lawyer (SIC 2010b).
5. Governance: The FME supervised the TIF. The Icelandic government formed a
Special Investigation Commission to report on the causes of the financial crisis.
The FME supervised the TIF’s operations and ensured that the TIF operates according to its
own mandate (Ásgeirsson 2005; Act No. 98/1999, Article 15). With the passing of emergency
legislation on October 6, 2008, the FME gained the power to take control of institutions and
place them into resolution (PMO 2008c).
Representatives from the CBI, FME, Ministries of Finance and Business Affairs, and the Prime
Minister’s Office formed the so-called “consultative group,” which bore managerial
responsibilities within the TIF and served as a communicative channel between the TIF and
the most relevant arms of the Icelandic government (SIC 2010b).
In December 2008, the Icelandic Parliament formed the Special Investigation Commission
(SIC) to investigate and analyze the collapse of Iceland’s three largest banks. The SIC partially
attributed the Icesave dispute to domestic inaction, arguing that financial regulators failed
to create an adequate contingency plan several years leading up to the bank failures in
October 2008 (SIC 2010a).
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6. Communication: The Prime Minister announced the full guarantee in an
impromptu speech and accidentally alarmed onlookers. Further press releases
pledged the Icelandic government to cover depositors insured under EU and EEA
regulation.
In a live speech to the Icelandic public on October 6, 2008, Prime Minister Haarde said that
domestic depositors and private pensioners would be able to access their deposits “in full.”
He said he would submit to Parliament emergency legislation allowing Icelandic government
agencies to counteract turbulence in financial markets (Haarde 2008). Haarde’s address
included the first mention of the full deposit guarantee, which the government later
explained as an effort to keep confidence in banks and mitigate the risk of a deposit run
(Haarde 2008; MOFE 2016).
Scholars argue that Haarde’s October 6 speech, which ended in the dramatic and atypical
phrase “Guð blessi Ísland” (“God bless Iceland”), was meant to calm the public, but his
unexpected timing and severe message alarmed onlookers—it sharply contradicted his
public statements from the previous day, in which he claimed that “no special action [was]
needed” (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016, 38; 62–64). Following the speech, Landsbanki
sustained large withdrawals from its online deposit accounts; outflows totaled EUR 1.4
billion between September 30 and October 6, 2008. Media observers expressed confusion
about how the guarantee mechanism would work, and UK officials asked the government to
clarify Haarde’s statement about the full guarantee with regards to the TIF’s coverage of
foreign branches (Bourke 2008; SIC 2010b). Standard & Poor’s (S&P) promptly downgraded
Iceland because it anticipated that the full guarantee would cause international markets to
shun the Icelandic banking system and lower domestic GDP, though S&P analysts argued that
the guarantee would limit Iceland’s contingent fiscal risks (ZCS 2008). Other ratings agencies
believed that the guarantee, paired with large capital injections, could actually “[impute]
repayment risk on private sector liabilities to the government” and increase the
government’s potential debt burden if it continued to nationalize Icelandic financial
institutions (R&I 2008).
After the Prime Minister’s October 6 speech, subsequent government press releases
communicated Iceland’s commitment to covering insured deposits, upholding EU and EEA
legislation, and negotiating further with other European counterparties. In describing the
parameters of the guarantee, government agencies broadly referred11 to EU and EEA
legislation without specifying the coverage of foreign branches of Icelandic banks (MFA-CC
2008). On November 3, 2008, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that the prioritization
of depositor claims was meant to “secure the interests of depositors in the foreign branches,”.
The statement continued, “Ideally, the bank’s assets will be worth enough to cover all
outstanding deposits,” implying that Iceland was not inclined to pay foreign depositors
directly from state coffers (MFA-CC 2008). The Ministry encouraged foreign governments to
On November 17, 2008, the Prime Minister’s Office reiterated the government’s commitment to “fair,
equitable, and non-discriminatory” treatment of creditors and insured depositors within the EEA framework
(PMO 2008a). The statement also acknowledged ongoing discussions with EU countries about the terms of
refinancing.
11
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safeguard assets and support subsidiaries of Icelandic banks, contrasting the Swedish and
Norwegian governments’ cooperation with the “difficult” and “damaging” actions taken by
the UK government (MFA-CC 2008). On November 17, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
released tentative guidelines of agreement between Iceland, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands on deposit insurance, committing Iceland to “cover deposits of insured
depositors in the Icesave accounts in accordance with EEA law” and to further consult with
EU Member States about the Icelandic state’s obligations (MFA 2008). The agreement
accompanied Iceland’s access to the IMF stabilization package, which the IMF Executive
Board approved on November 19 (MFA 2008; Thomsen 2008).
The TIF did not mention the full guarantee in any of its public media in 2008. However, the
TIF acknowledged the ongoing status of the Icesave dispute starting in 2011, beginning with
the Board’s decision to pay Icesave depositors with proceeds from Landsbanki’s bankruptcy
estate (TIF 2011).
7. Size of Guarantees: The government said that the guarantee was unlimited for
domestic depositors but did not cover EUR 15 billion in foreign deposits.
Prime Minister Haarde did not specify a limit to the deposit guarantee announced on October
6, 2008 (Haarde 2008). Onlookers, including the CBI, interpreted the guarantee as unlimited
for domestic depositors (CBI 2009b; Bourke 2008). The full guarantee, if it were legally
binding, would have covered about ISK 1.6 trillion (EUR 10.6 billion) in 2008, which was
slightly above Iceland’s GDP at the time (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The TIF had insufficient funds to cover the
minimum guarantee and decided not to borrow or use future premiums to cover
the cost of payouts. The minimum guarantee was later funded by asset recovery
from bankruptcy, but the government did not specify a source of funding for the
unlimited guarantee.
Since its establishment in 2000, the TIF was required to maintain a minimum level of assets
equal to 1% of the average of guaranteed deposits across all commercial banks and savings
banks from the previous year (Act No. 98/1999, Article 6). If the TIF’s total assets did not
reach the minimum for a given year, all banks were required to individually contribute an
amount equal to 0.15% of the average of their individually guaranteed deposits from the
prior year. When Landsbanki failed in October 2008, the TIF’s krona-denominated assets
totaled ISK 16 billion (EUR 130 million12), around 0.41% of guaranteed deposits, as the
krona rapidly depreciated against foreign currencies (TIF 2011; BMS 2020). As it became
clear that the TIF would not be able to pay EUR 20,887 to every depositor of the failed
Icelandic banks, the TIF explored several options for funding the minimum guarantee and
eventually settled on asset recovery (TIF 2011). The TIF never claimed responsibility for the
full guarantee declared by Prime Minister Geir Haarde on October 6, 2008.

12

On October 7, 2008, ISK 1 = USD 0.008, per Bloomberg.
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Throughout 2008, the TIF had contemplated offloading its deposit insurance obligations to
foreign deposit insurers. In February 2008, Landsbanki considered transferring deposits
from its Icesave branches to UK-based subsidiaries, a shift that would have obligated the UK
to extend its deposit insurance program—the Financial Services Compensation Scheme—to
Icesave’s depositors under EU Directive 94/19/EC (SIC 2010b; BMS 2020). The UK Financial
Services Authority (FSA) first required Landsbanki to transfer sufficient assets and liquidity
along with deposits to the relevant UK subsidiary (BMS 2020). Though officials from Iceland,
the FSA, and Landsbanki discussed a potential transfer during the summer of 2008, the plan
never materialized (SIC 2010b). Landsbanki was either unwilling or unable to comply with
the UK’s preconditions on intragroup liquidity before the bank collapsed (BMS 2020).
The TIF Board considered borrowing to fund the minimum guarantee. Under Act No.
98/1999, the TIF Board could borrow to meet TIF obligations if the fund’s resources were
insufficient (Act No. 98/1999, Article 10, para. 2). The legislation did not specify a lender,
and a prerequisite for such a loan was that the Icelandic government would guarantee its
repayment (TIF 2011). By October 2008, however, neither the central bank nor the Ministry
of Finance had sufficient resources to credibly lend to the TIF or guarantee repayment on
the TIF’s behalf—especially given the TIF’s large and increasing obligations stemming from
foreign-currency deposits (BMS 2020). In the fourth quarter of 2008, the UK government
repaid its Icesave depositors GBP 3.5 billion of GBP 4.53 billion in retail deposits, and the
Dutch government similarly repaid EUR 1.6 of EUR 1.67 billion (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson
2016). In December 2008, the Icelandic government tentatively planned to treat a portion13
of the UK and Dutch depositor repayments as loans from the TIF to the foreign
governments—about EUR 1.6 billion owed the Dutch and GBP 2.2 billion owed to the UK,
with each loan paying 5.5% annual interest. But this did not happen. The Icelandic
Parliament did not approve the initial repayment plan because members were concerned
about incurring a potentially large debt burden while recovering from a financial crisis. From
2009 to 2011, the Icesave agreement underwent two more iterations of debate,
amendments, and public referendums, but the Icelanders and foreign debtors were unable
to agree on any single set of repayment terms. In 2011, the TIF Board ultimately ruled out
borrowing to fund the minimum guarantee because they could not anticipate the timing of
payments related to Landsbanki’s bankruptcy and asset recovery, so it was impossible to
forecast interest expenses (TIF 2011). The debtor-creditor disagreement escalated to the
EFTA Court, which held its first oral hearing on September 18, 2012 (Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016).
The TIF Board also ruled out funding via ex-post fees. Beginning in 2009, the TIF collected
contributions from members to form a new guarantee fund meant to provision for the future
failure of institutions, including the successors to the big three banks (TIF 2011). The TIF
Board decided that it would not make insurance premiums collected after 2008 available to
pay out depositors in banks that had failed in 2008, based on the principle that only funds
available at the time of a bank failure should be used to pay back that bank’s depositors.

The Icelandic liability was set equal to the Icelandic minimum guarantee of EUR 20,887 to each of Icesave’s
foreign retail depositors (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
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Limited in its options for funding depositor payouts, the TIF Board relied on Landsbanki’s
wind-up proceedings to pay depositors up to the minimum guarantee (TIF 2011). The TIF
Board decided that Landsbanki depositors should be paid first among failed banks because
it was the first bank that the FME declared unable to meet depositors’ claims. The potential
payout to Landsbanki depositors was so large that the TIF ruled it would have no further
funds available for depositors of Kaupthing or Glitnir.14 However, the TIF anticipated that
the liquidation of Landsbanki’s assets would cover the minimum guarantee of EUR 20,887
owed to each Landsbanki depositor. The Landsbanki estate began payments in 2013 after
the EFTA Court ruling, and it completed them on January 11, 2016 (Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016).
The Icelandic government never specified a potential source or size of funding for its full
guarantee (Haarde 2008; MOFE 2016). If there had been depositor payouts, the government
would have had to rely on fiscal resources to cover them, according to an external reviewer
to this case. However, this proved unnecessary after the government nationalized the old
banks and transferred domestic deposits to the new banks, because domestic depositors
could neither convert their currency nor exit the Icelandic financial system (Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016). Nonetheless, since the GFC, international institutions such as the Bank
for International Settlements have called for Iceland to establish a credible backstop
arrangement for its deposit guarantee fund (BMS 2020).
9. Eligible Institutions: The full guarantee included domestic branches of Icelandic
banks and excluded foreign branches and subsidiaries.
Eligible institutions included “domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in
Iceland” (PMO 2008b). Member companies all belonged to the TIF’s Deposit Department (SIC
2010b).
The Icelandic government’s different treatment of foreign and domestic deposits was at the
center of the Icesave dispute (TN 2013; EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). In
December 2008, the UK government disbursed GBP 3.5 billion of the GBP 4.53 billion owed
to Icesave’s UK retail depositors and Dutch paid out EUR 1.6 billion of EUR 1.67 billion owed
to Dutch retail depositors (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). The UK and Dutch governments
sought reimbursement from the TIF and the Icelandic state through the EFTA Court, citing
Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit
guarantee schemes, and requested that either the Icelandic government or the TIF repay
them in amounts equal to the TIF’s minimum guarantee for all UK and Dutch Icesave
depositors (EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). EU Directive 94/19/EC stated that
a parent country’s deposit guarantee system must extend to deposits held by the foreign
branches of a bank based in the parent country (SIC 2010b). If the host country’s guarantee
fund offered higher coverage than the parent country, then the host country had to extend
Foreign governments compensated Kaupthing’s and Glitnir’s foreign depositors by seizing and liquidating
the assets held by the banks’ subsidiaries, among other measures (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016; GRJ 2018).
Kaupthing’s and Glitnir’s domestic depositors did not require compensation because Icelanders retained
depositor access after the Icelandic government nationalized the old banks and transferred domestic deposits
to the new banks (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
14
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membership to the same foreign branches. Irrespective of coverage levels in the host and
parent countries, the host country’s deposit insurer was responsible for covering any
subsidiaries incorporated in the host country. The plaintiffs alleged that the Icelandic
government failed to ensure that Icesave’s foreign branch depositors received minimum
payments equivalent to those received by Iceland’s domestic depositors, which was
discriminatory on the basis of nationality and in violation of the EU Directive (EFTA
Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013).
Iceland argued that the “obligation [to pay foreign depositors] could not be derived from the
principle of non-discrimination” because the EU Directive does not address large bank
failure (EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). It was not clear that currencyconvertible foreign deposits were at an economic disadvantage compared to the krona-only
Icelandic deposits, and nobody in Iceland had received payments under the full guarantee.
Furthermore, the defense noted, the full guarantee applied only to the reestablished banks,
whereas the foreign deposits were contained in separate legal entities and entitled to
proceeds from asset recovery. The plaintiffs never argued that the foreign deposits also
should have been transferred to the new banks, so, in the defense’s view, the plaintiffs “[did]
not argue that the two groups should have been treated equally,” weakening the allegations
of discrimination (EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). While the Icesave dispute
was underway, neither the Icelandic government nor the TIF made any payments to foreign
depositors because Iceland’s obligations to pay was uncertain, and capital controls restricted
the Icelandic government’s ability to convert ISK to other currencies (TN 2013). On January
28, 2013, the EFTA Court ruled that the Icelandic authorities did not have to compensate the
Icesave depositors, but that UK and Dutch governments had priority claim on proceeds from
Landsbanki’s bankruptcy estate (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
10. Eligible Accounts: All domestic deposits denominated in krona were covered. The
Icelandic government granted depositors priority claims in bankruptcy
proceedings, which was later challenged but upheld in EFTA Court.
Eligible deposits referred to “all deposits by general customers and companies which are
covered by the Deposit Division of the [TIF]” (PMO 2008b). The TIF defined “deposit” as “any
credit balance resulting from financial deposits or transfers in normal banking transactions,
which a commercial bank or savings bank is under obligation to refund under existing legal
or contractual terms” (TIF 2011). The deposit guarantee did not extend to member
companies’ own deposits, those of their parents or subsidiaries, or deposits associated with
money laundering. The TIF also expressed uncertainty about the inclusion of money market
and wholesale deposits fell under the definition of “deposits” as described by Act No.
98/1999 on Deposit Guarantees and Investor Compensation Scheme (Act No. 98/1999,
Article 3, para. 9; TIF 2011).
Following the passage of emergency legislation, the Icelandic government clarified that it
was willing to reimburse fully guaranteed accounts only in krona (PMO 2008c). The general
scholarly consensus maintained that it would have been impossible for the Icelandic
government to guarantee deposits denominated in foreign currency, which alone accounted
for 125% of GDP (BET 2017; Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
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The emergency legislation also granted depositors priority claims within insolvency
proceedings (PMO 2008c). This bail-in of creditors (mostly foreign) was a key part of the
program because it enabled the Icelandic government to shift the domestic deposits to the
reestablished banks, thereby preserving the Icelandic public’s access to deposits and basic
financial services (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016). Creditors, whose claims legally ranked
on par with those of depositors before the crisis, ended up losing about EUR 10 billion when
the Icelandic authorities changed the rules. Iceland’s decision was controversial at the time,
and creditors challenged the bail-in maneuver in court (Thomsen 2018). Defending its
prioritization of depositors, the Icelandic state cited force majeure and claimed that it had no
alternative, given the need to preserve the domestic payment system (Jónsson and
Sigurgeirsson 2016; EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 2013). While the international
court ultimately ruled that Iceland had not breached EEA law, the opposite ruling would have
saddled the Icelandic state with high levels of debt (GRJ 2018). One senior IMF official
suggested that Iceland’s intervention and recovery has since shifted views about the use of
bail-in, which is now considered more acceptable than it was during the Global Financial
Crisis (Thomsen 2018).
11. Fees: There were no fees.
There were no fees associated with the unlimited guarantee (MOFE 2016).
12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The FME transferred the fully guaranteed
deposits from old banks to new banks; the Icelandic government did not specify
additional processes for exercising guarantees.
After taking control of and resolving the three banks, FME split each bank into an old bank
and a new bank; the new banks retained the principal (book) value of domestic deposits,
along with most of the Icelandic assets, on their balance sheets (BET 2017; FME 2009). The
new banks also received capital injections via equity and subordinated loans, which summed
to about 12% of GDP (BET 2017). The old banks held onto the rest of the assets and liabilities.
Domestic bank customers maintained complete access to their deposits without disruption
(Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
The government did not specify how it would have exercised the guarantee in the event of
further depositor withdrawals, though it maintained partial ownership of the new banks in
proportion to the amount of refinancing (BET 2017).
13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts: There were no additional
restrictions.
There do not seem to be any additional restrictions on eligible institutions or accounts other
than those described.
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14. Duration: The full guarantee was announced without a definite timeline and
lasted eight years.
The deposit guarantee announced on October 6, 2008, was formally retracted on September
9, 2016 (Haarde 2008; MOFE 2016). According to an EFTA translation of the Minister of
Economic Affairs’ interview with a news outlet, he claimed in 2010 that the unlimited deposit
guarantee would be withdrawn once an “alternative and effective” deposit system was in
place (ESA 2010). In 2011, the government created a new TIF division separated from the
old guarantee fund; the new division was responsible for covering deposits in the
reestablished banks, though the new fund did not specify its source of emergency funding or
the timeliness of its repayments (BMS 2020). In 2012, the Icelandic government proposed a
bill15 for a new depositor and investor guarantee scheme based on EU Directive 2009/14/EC
(CBI 2012). Though the bill ultimately did not pass parliamentary procedure, it specified,
among other provisions, a guarantee worth the ISK equivalent of EUR 100,000, a maximum
payout deadline of 20 days, and an increase in the deposit fund to 4% of total deposits (CBI
2012). It is not clear why the bill did not become law. Retrospective IMF documents from
2014 and 2015 noted the Icelandic government’s plans to form new deposit guarantee
legislation in line with EU directives, and IMF staff advised strengthening TIF’s operations
and communicating with the public about moving to an explicit limited guarantee (IMF 2014;
Dohlman 2015). Upon retracting the full guarantee in 2016, the government acknowledged
that “domestic deposit institutions stand on solid ground in terms of capital, funding,
liquidity, and operational balance” (MOFE 2016). As of March 2020, the government planned
to try again to incorporate the EU’s Deposit Guarantee Directive into domestic legislation
(BMS 2020).
According to an external reviewer to this case, after the crisis the Icelandic government
implemented new liquidity coverage rules that limit the currency risk associated with
Iceland’s deposit insurance.

Bill of Legislation on Deposit Guarantees and an Investor Compensation Scheme, Item 237 of the 139th
Legislative Session (CBI 2012).
15
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